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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (i) (Cum. Supp.
1994) .
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue I. Did the District Court err in awarding custody of
the parties' minor children to the Defendant as well as awarding
alimony to the Defendant inasmuch as the Defendant failed to
file any answer or counterclaim for custody or alimony?
Standard
question

of

correctness.
Issue 2.

of
law,

Review.

The

accordingly,

foregoing

issue

the

is

same

presents

reviewed

a

for

T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988).
Was there sufficient evidence to support the

District Court's finding that:
Each of the parties are fit and proper
persons to be awarded the care, custody and
control of the parties' minor children, and
an award of joint custody is appropriate,
with the residential custody to be with the
mother. The court has determined in weighing
the factors as set forth in Rule 4-903 of the
Code of Judicial Administration and the other
factors as presented to the court at trial
that it would be in the best interest of the
children to be with the defendant.
Standard of Review.

"Findings of fact . . . shall not be

set aside unless clearly erroneous."
Under that standard,

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

[appellate courts] do not set aside the

trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear
weight of the evidence or

[the court] otherwise reach [es] a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Western Kane County Special Service Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).
Issue 3.

Was there sufficient evidence to support the

District Court's finding that:
The most compelling factor weighing in
favor of the defendant
is a stronger
willingness on the part of the defendant to
see that visitation continues with the other
parent. The court believes that it is very
appropriate that each of the parties maintain
their substantial relationship with the
children including substantial time with the
children. The court found no indication of
interference with parental contact on the
part of the defendant.
Standard of Review.

"Findings of fact . . . shall not be

set aside unless clearly erroneous."
Under that standard,

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

[appellate courts] do not set aside the

trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear
weight of the evidence or

[the court] otherwise reach[es] a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
Western Kane County Special Service Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson
Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).

2

DETERMINATIVE LAW
1.

Determinative Law:
a.

Constitutional Provisions:

b.

Statutes:

c.

Case Law:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final order entered in the

Third Judicial District Court on or about November 7, 1995,
granting custody of the above parties7 minor children to the
Defendant (R. 216-224).
B.
1.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

The Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in the

above captioned matter on July 8, 1994, seeking custody of the
parties' minor children.
2.

(R. 1-3).

The Defendant never filed an answer or counterclaim

seeking custody of the minor children or an award of alimony.
(No citation in record).
3.

A trial was held in this matter on July 5-7, 1995.

(R.

208) .
5.

After trial, the Decree of Divorce and the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered by the District Court
3

on or about July 31, 1995 addressing all issues except that of
custody of the minor children. (R. 199-212).
6.

The District Court held a further hearing as to the

issue of custody on August 10, 1995. (R. 216).
7.

After trial, the court entered Supplemental Findings of

Fact and Order on November 7, 1995. (R. 216-224).
8.

No post-judgment motions were filed.
C.

1.

Statement of Relevant Facts

The Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in the

above matter on or about July 8, 1994, seeking custody of the
parties' three minor children. (R. 1-3).
2.

The Defendant never filed any answer to Plaintiff's

complaint or counterclaim seeking custody of the minor children
or alimony.

This, despite several admonishments from the court

to file an answer and/or counterclaim. (R. 236-237; 471-473) .
3.

During the pendency of the divorce (approximately 18

months), the Plaintiff was awarded temporary custody of the
parties' minor children. (R. 78-79) .
4.

Although

the

custody

evaluator

recommended

that

residential custody be vested in Defendant, a psychological
evaluation commissioned by the custody evaluator recommended
that the Plaintiff be awarded primary physical custody due to

4

the fitness of the Plaintiff as well as certain characterological defects of the Defendant. (R. 760-763).
5.

After

trial,

the

court,

without

any

answer

or

counterclaim on file, awarded the Defendant residential custody
of the parties' minor children, as well as alimony in the amount
of $400.00. (R. 216-224).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Issue 1.

Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that " [there shall be a complaint and an answer."
7(a) Utah R. Civ. P.

Rule

Further, Rule 8(d) of the same rules

provides that "[a]verments in a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is required . . . are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading."

Rule 8(d) Utah R. Civ. P.

In the instant

case, the Defendant failed to file an answer to Plaintiff's
complaint admitting or denying the allegations set forth in
Plaintiff's complaint.

Moreover, Defendant failed to file a

counterclaim seeking custody of the parties' minor children
and/or alimony, despite repeated admonishments by the District
Court.

Accordingly, the District Court's award of custody to

the Defendant as well as the award of alimony was without basis
in the record and should be overturned.
Issue 2. The weight of the evidence presented at trial
demonstrated that the Plaintiff was the more fit and appropriate
5

custodian for the minor children; however the court disregarded
such evidence and awarded custody to the Defendant.

Inasmuch as

the court's finding as to custody was against the clear weight
of the evidence, such finding should be overturned and the
custody order should be vacated.
Issue 3.

There was insufficient evidence to support

the District Court's finding that Defendant be awarded custody
based on her willingness to facilitate visitation between the
minor children and the non-custodial parent.

Particularly,

there was no evidence that the Plaintiff purposefully denied the
Defendant

visitation

with

the

minor

children;

rather,

the

evidence indicated that the only times that visitation was not
effected was when Defendant diverged from the set schedule and
failed to give Plaintiff timely notice of visitation.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
INASMUCH AS DEFENDANT NEVER FILED AN ANSWER TO
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SEEKING CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' CHILDREN,
NOR A COUNTERCLAIM SEEKING CUSTODY AND AN AWARD OF ALIMONY,
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING HER CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN AND
ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT OF $400.00.
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
pertinent part: " [t]here shall be a complaint and an answer[.]"
Rule 7 Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added) .
6

That rule does not

vest any discretion in the district court to waive the filing of
an answer

to the subject

complaint, however, such rule

is

jurisdictional and mandates that an answer be on file.1
In the case at bar, the Plaintiff filed his complaint on
July 8, 1994, however, at no time up to and including the trial
in this matter, did the Defendant file an answer thereto.

At

the open of trial on July 5, 1995, counsel for the Plaintiff
represented to the court that custody was not legally at issue
inasmuch

as

counterclaim.

the

Defendant

had

yet

to

file

any

answer

or

Counsel for Defendant responded as follows:

Your Honor, I would have to look through
the file.
I obviously had assumed that [I
had filed an answer and counterclaim]. If I
didn't, it was completely an oversight. I've
never been requested. There's no notice of
default and, certainly, the issues are clear
in this matter. I will be happy, obviously,
if in fact there was an oversight and I
Further, Rule 8(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
(d) Effect of failure to deny.
Averments in a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is required. . .
are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading.
Rule 8(d) Utah R. Civ. P.
Pursuant to the above rule, inasmuch as a responsive
pleading is required under Rule 7 and the Defendant
failed to deny the allegations contained in Plaintiff's
complaint, such allegations should be admitted.
See
Stevens v. Collard.
7

didn't file an answer, to file an answer
today, which I believe the Court, in its
discretion, could certainly permit.
(R. 237).
The Court responded as follows:
All right. Well, I will anticipate that
you should file the appropriate documents so
that the record is complete with your answer
and counterclaim.
(R. 237).
In response to the foregoing, the District Court granted
Plaintiff's motion for Defendant's leave to file an answer and
counterclaim.

(R. 192) . However, despite such leave, no answer

or counterclaim was ever filed.
Finally, on the last day of trial, Defendant had yet to
file the responsive documents.

In fact, when counsel for the

Plaintiff objected to the court considering the issue of alimony
inasmuch as Defendant had not filed the appropriate pleadings,
the court provided:
I'm not going to rule on whether the
filing fee should be paid to make the claim.
If somebody wants to raise a claim before the
court, they have to pay a filing fee and
raise the claim. If there's going to be no
counterclaim, there will be no alimony.
I
don't think I have any jurisdiction over it.
So there has to be a counterclaim to claim
it, it seems to me.

8

Well, let me put it this way.
I fully
intend to resolve the question of alimony in
this action. And if you want to run the risk
of having a legal pleading deficient and have
that remain as an issue that could be
reviewed by an appellate court, I suppose
that's something you're going to have to do.
But it would be something where I would be
put in a position that I may not have
jurisdiction to lawfully if there is no
counterclaim filed.
(R. 471-72) (emphasis added).
Here, the fact of the matter is that Defendant had every
opportunity to file an answer and counterclaim, seeking the
award

of

custody

of

the parties'

children

and/or

alimony;

however, Defendant never filed the responsive documents despite
repeated promises to file the same.

Pursuant to Rule 7 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to file an answer is
jurisdictional.

Further, as provided by the court above, the

Defendant's failure to file a counterclaim for custody and/or
alimony was likewise jurisdictional.

Accordingly, inasmuch as

Defendant failed to file an answer to Plaintiff's complaint or
a counterclaim seeking custody and/or alimony, the district
court was without jurisdiction to award the Defendant custody of
the parties' children and alimony in the amount of $400.00.2

At very minimum, the court below should have stayed
proceedings to allow the Defendant to file the legally
mandated responsive pleadings.
9

POINT II
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS FIT
TO BE AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE
PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN.
After trial, the District Court found:
1. Each of the parties are fit and proper persons
to be awarded the care, custody and control of the
parties' minor children, and an award of joint custody
is appropriate, with the residential custody to be
with the mother.
(R. 216-17).
In order to challenge a finding, the challenging party must
"marshall

the evidence

demonstrate

that

in support of

despite

this

the

evidence,

finding
the

and

trial

then

court's

finding [is] so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear
weight of the evidence,' thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'"
Haqen v. Haqen, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991) . (quoting In
Re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886

(Utah 1989); accord

4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 889 P.2d 467, 471
(Utah 1995) .
In

the

case

at

bar,

the

evidence

in

support

of

foregoing finding was as follows:
First, the Plaintiff testified as follows:
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] All right. So she
didn't clean the bedrooms, but was she primarily
responsible for the rest of the operation of the
house?
10

the

A.

[By Plaintiff]

Yes.

(R. 327).
Q. [By Defendant's counsel]
Was there an
instance during the marriage when Michelle was
responsible for providing care for the children that
she failed to have an appropriate supervisor there to
take care of the kids?
A.

I do not recall one.

(R. 329).
Q. It's true, isn't it, that the majority of
times that the children went to the doctor or the
dentist, Michelle took them?
A.

Yes.

(R. 412).
John C. Whitehead, Defendant's father testified as follows:
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] Okay. How would you
describe Michelle's interactions with her children?
A. Well, she is a typical caring, loving mother.
She has provided that to the three older boys and the
three younger boys. In spite of the problems with the
first marriage that dissolved, she took care of those
boys as a mother should and did. She has, in my view
and my wife's view, has been a very loving, caring
mother during these recent problems with--especially
since Eric's left the home.
Q. During the time period, let's say the five
years before their separation, did you have concerns
that Michelle was ignoring the children or putting her
needs in front of the children?
A.

Definitely not.

Definitely no.

(R. 451-52).
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Larene Dimond, Shayla's school teacher testified:
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] You indicated that
when Michelle comes into the room, if Shayla hasn't
seen that she's there, she goes over and initiates the
contact.
If Shayla sees that her mother comes in,
does she appear to be happy to see her?
A.

Oh, yeah.

Q.
Okay.
Do they
nurturing relationship?
A.

appear

to

have

a

warm,

Yeah.

Q. Does Michelle
parent?
A. As
classroom.

far

as

appear to be an appropriate

I've

just

observed

her

in

the

(R. 477).
Elizabeth Bennett, a friend of the Defendant, testified as
follows:
Q. [By Defendant's counsel] How does Michelle
seem to get along with the older children?
A. Good. She's a very supportive mother. She,
you know, she's always got their friends over there
and-Q. Do you have concerns that Michelle is not
properly supervising any of the children when they're
there?
A.

No.

Q. Do you have
parenting abilities?

concerns

about

Michelle's

A.

No.

Q.

What do you believe her strengths are?
12

A.

I think her strengths are her kids.

Q. What are her
parenting abilities?

strengths

in

terms

of

her

A. She's--she's very teaching and she is very
health conscious. She tries to, you know, keep them
aware of what they are eating and what is healthy
and--and exercise is very important. She, you know,
wants them to grow and achieve as much as they can.
Q. Are you personally aware of whether Michelle
helps the kids with their school work, for instance?
A. Yes, she does. She's very involved with her-she's helped them with--I can't think of the word-assignments or reports that they've had to get in,
she's stayed up nights helping them and, you know,
when they've had to keep--get them in early in the
morning or something.
Q. Are you aware of any instances when Michelle
has left the children unsupervised or inappropriately
supervised?
A.

No.

(R. 520-523).
Jeaneen Bridgwater, Defendant's neighbor, testified as
follows:
Q. [By Defendant's counsel]
[D]id you
observe Michelle with the younger kids?

also

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what kind of interaction did she have?

A. She would play with them, do things with them.
She was always lovey-dovey with them, very affectionate with them.
Q.

Was she able to set limits for them?
13

A. Yes. There was--like I would go exercising
with her, or I would be with her in the home and there
was always rules that they had to follow, you know?
Q. Were you able to form any kind of conclusion
as to who, between Eric and Michelle, was more
involved in the discipline of the children?
A. I didn't see Eric disciplining at all. But
then Eric wasn't there very often.
He was always
working.
Q. Okay. Are you aware of any instances when
Michelle just left the children and they were
completely unsupervised?
A.

Not that I'm aware of.

Q. All right. Have you observed Michelle with
the younger children during this separation period?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And what has her interaction with them been?

A. She's very concerned with them, she's very
worried about their health, nutrition. They've been
real clingy to her. They seem to cry more because
they feel like they want to be there with Eric.
Q. All right.
good parent?
A.

Do you believe that Michelle is a

Yes, I do.

Q. Do you believe that Michelle is capable of
taking care of all six of the kids?
A.

Yes, I do.

(R. 528-544) .
Collette Talley, another neighbor of Michelle's, testified:
Q. And what did you observe
interactions with the children?
14

of

Michelle's

A. I had a lot of dealings with Michelle because
we were in the Primary together and, you know, she
would bring the younger children with her to our
presidency meetings and that kind of thing. Michelle
was always really wonderful with the children. Very
attentive. And I've never seen her raise her voice or
be angry with her children. Just a very good mother,
very loving.
Q.

Did she interact well with them?

A.

On yeah.

Very well with them.

Q. Would you characterize her as someone who
would put her own needs before those of the children?
A. No, not--I'm not sure of what kind of things
we'd be talking about, but over all of the time that
I've known Michelle, I have seen a great deal of
concern and care for her children.
And I don't
believe that she would ever put herself above them,
no.
(R.

551-57).
A review of the Exhibit record indicates that the actual

custody evaluation was never entered into evidence, however, the
following testimony of Kim Peterson supports the finding in
question.3
Q.
discern
as well
who had

[By Defendant's counsel]
Were you able to
from your interviews with Michelle and Eric,
as your interviews with the children, as to
been the primary caretaker of the kids?

For purposes of his marshalling requirement, Plaintiff
submits that in addition to the testimony cited, a
complete review of Kim Peterson's testimony would be
warranted by this court.
15

A. It is my feeling that it had been Michelle,
and that was primarily based on the fact that she had
been mostly home with the children.
(R. 565).
Q. Now, that was a pretty long litany of
characteristics that I don't suppose anybody here is
going to describe as at the top of the list, the ones
you'd want applied to yourself. How do you jibe that
description of psychological characteristics with
Michelle's ability to function as a parent?
A. Well, I think they speak more towards her
problems in close interpersonal relationships with
adults, but, potentially, could have a very negative
impact on her ability to parent, particularly the part
about needing to have relationships with men, being
more self-centered, self focused.
If that is not kept in check, potentially, she
would become neglectful to the degree that I and, I
think, everybody else in here would be very concerned.
I have not seen that level of problems. There have
been some things that she's done.
For example,
keeping the kids home from school on Fridays, which
hasn't particularly shown good judgment. I think I
understand why she's done it in terms of missing the
kids. But, nevertheless, that kind of behavior is not
in their best interest.
And relationships with boyfriends, potentially I
could see her becoming involved to the point that the
kids are not her first priority. But then again, I
have not--based on what I have been able to see on
past reports and her behavior and so forth, it doesn't
appear as though her involvement has been to the
extreme where it would have a major negative impact on
the children.
Q. What is a more valuable tool in terms of
trying to predict what kind of a parent is going to be
in the future, the experience that you can look to of
the parent over the past 15 years or the results of an
MMPI and those kinds of personality characteristics
saying in the future there might be problems.
16

A. Uh-huh. Past behavior is the better predictor
of future behavior.
Q. Okay. Now, based upon her past behavior and
all of the reports that you've been given by Eric and
the collateral resources and by Michelle and by the
children, do you believe--do you feel comfortable in
saying that you believe, in the future, the likelihood
is that Michelle will continue to be competent caretaker of her children?
A. There are certainly risks or possibilities
that she won't be. But based on what I know of her,
I would say that she would continue to be an adequate
parent that will take care of her children, attend to
their needs, be nurturing, giving them sufficient
attention and parenting.
Q. Now first of all, are both Michelle and Eric
Hogan fit and capable parents to provide parenting to
these children?
A.

Yes they are.

Q. If the children were to be placed in the
custody of their mother, would you anticipate any
irreversible trauma to the kids from a change of
primary residency?
A. No, I would not. It's a home and neighborhood
that they're familiar with and, certainly, they have
a very positive relationship with their mother.
Q. Okay. Now, in this instant situation, what is
your recommendation with regard to where the children
ought to be living?
A. Well, in looking at all of the factors, even
though I see Eric as being more emotionally stable and
more fit in many ways, the differences between he and
Michelle, given the level of bonding that the children
have with each parent and given her circumstances, I
don't think that those positive qualities in Eric, his
greater emotional stability is great enough to warrant
designating him as being the children's primary
caregiver.
17

In looking at his circumstance, I certainly don't
have any problems with him being the primary
caregiver.
But, basically, in looking at her
circumstances, I see her as being in somewhat of a
better position to have primary custody or to have her
home be designated as the children's primary residence
from which they would have their basic base, from
where they would attend school and so forth.
And I'm not making that a real strong recommendation, because we have to, obviously, take into account
the other factors that were discussed in this report
too. And it's not a situation where you have a good
parent and a bad parent or one is, you know,
significantly superior than the other.
In certain
respects, she comes out quite a ways ahead and other
respects, Eric comes out way ahead.
But when we average all of that stuff together, I
see it somewhat better the circumstance for the
primary custody to be with Michelle.
(R. 363-74)
Considerable testimony of the Defendant likewise supports
the finding at issue.

Such testimony is located in the record

from 648-713.
Finally,

for purposes

of

the

marshalling

requirement,

counsel for Defendant proferred certain testimony from Dr. Jay
Thomas' deposition as follows:
[By Defendant's counsel] I would indicate that on page 73,
line 2, I asked him:
"Can you state with any certainty that
Michelle Hogan is an unfit parent?
"Answer:

No, I cannot."

(R. 765).

18

Notwithstanding

the

foregoing

marshalled

evidence,

Plaintiff shall prove that such did not support the court's
finding regarding the Defendant's fitness as to custody of the
minor children.4
Initially, the Plaintiff testified that he played a primary
caregiver role to the minor children.

(R. 263-275). 5

Specifi-

cally, Plaintiff testified that he was the parent who would help
the children with their homework, would make sure that the
children attended dance and other lessons, and would get up with
the children at night.

Plaintiff requests this court to pay particular note to
the considerable evidence introduced regarding the
Defendant's past moral standards, particularly in light
of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-3-10(1) (1994), which provides
in pertinent part:
If a husband and wife having
minor children are separated, or
their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an
order for the future care and
custody of the minor children as it
considers appropriate.
In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the
child and the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of each
of the parties.
Utah Code Ann. sec. 30-3-10(1) (1994).
Again, inasmuch as a considerable portion of the
Plaintiff's testimony goes to fitness, a review of the
transcript of his testimony is warranted.
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Further,

Plaintiff

testified

about

Defendant's

suicide

attempts.
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel]
ever talked to you about suicide?
A.

Yes she has.

Q.

When?

Sir, has Michelle

A. The last time was the fall of '94. A couple
of months before we had--before we separated. Not the
fall of '94, the spring of '94, excuse me. Maybe late
winter.
We--Michelle told me she'd been thinking
about--about suicide and she's--she'd expressed those
feelings several times before in our marriage.
She told me that she had even gone as far as
talking to Shayla about it. She had talked to Shayla
and told Shayla that "Mommy may not always be around"
but that Mommy loved her.
(R. 303).
Further, the Plaintiff

testified

about numerous extra-

marital affairs in which Defendant was involved. During several
of said affairs, the minor children were present.
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel]
Sir, we talked
earlier about the fact about her involvement with the
men. Is there a time when she had--that you observed
that she had any one of the children with her when she
was being involved with a man?
A, Yes, there were. The day I watched her making
out with the bodybuilder, she had our child with her
in the van. She was sitting in his lap and she was
all over him. And he was asleep for most of it, but
he woke up-Q.

The child?

A.

Yes.
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Q. Not the bodybuilder. Let's get the definition
as to who was asleep.
A. The child was asleep through most of it.
Towards the end, he woke up, Michelle held him for a
minute and then strapped him back into his seat and
continued to make out with Kendall.

Q. Have you known of other times when she's taken
the children with her to rendezvous with another
fellow?
A. I know--yes, I do. She had a picnic with one
guy. He brought his kids, she brought hers. They had
a picnic together.
303-04) .
Helen Hogan, the Plaintiff's mother, testified as follows:
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Would you describe
Eric's relationship with the children?
A. He's a loving father. He's always concerned
about them. He spends a lot of time, in fact, all of
his time with them, when he is home. He plays with
them, interacts with them. He talks to them and reads
to them at night. We have family prayers together and
read scriptures together before they go to bed. Have
home evening. Takes them to church.
Q. Ma'am, has he given the responsibility of
taking care of these children when he's home to you or
does he do it?
A.

He does not.

Q. Have you seen Eric try to solve problems with
the children?
A.

Yes, and he's very good with solving problems.

442-44).
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John C. Whitehead, Defendant's father, further attested to
Plaintiff's parental fitness.

When asked what he believed the

Plaintiff's strengths were, he responded "Well, I love Eric too.
I think he is a loving father.
father."

I think he's a competent

(R. 453) .

Larene Dimond, Shayla's teacher, testified that Shayla had
considerable absences when she was in her mother's custody.
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Ma'am in regards to
that, what days is it that Shayla usually has missed
when she's missed days?
A.

Mostly on Fridays.

Q.

And what is the reason for that; do you know?

A. The only thing that I know about Fridays is
that she is with her mother.
(R. 474).
Moreover,
regarding
thereof.

the

several

neighbors

Plaintiff's

fitness

of
and

the

parties

testified

the Defendant's

lack

Alisa Madill testified that she "was always impressed

with [Eric's] involvement, the coaching teams, the playing out
in the front yard.

And, again, that was mostly Eric with that

or the grandfathers working with them on scout projects or
mother--Eric' s mom teaching piano, things like that."

(R. 480) .

She further testified that "when [Michelle] decides to do things
and she does it for show. And it isn't--the center of attention
is drawn to herself.

When there are activities that we go
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together for the kids, Michelle's the person who wants the
center of attention, not so much her kids."

(R. 481).

Ms.

Madill also testified that the Defendant had phoned her and
discussed suicide.

(R. 481-83).

Finally, she testified that

Shayla, the minor child, had come to her home one evening at
approximately 11:00 p.m. and reported that her mother had left
her alone.

(R. 256).

In responding to her concerns about the

Defendant, she stated "Consistency in parenting, blaming.

When

children do things wrong, blaming other people for what they do
wrong.

Then the environment that she creates with other men."

(R. 491).
Paula Jensen, another neighbor, testified:
I think Eric is a unique father. All fathers love
their children and have a desire to be with their
children to some extent. But I think Eric is a lot
like a mother too. He--he loves them and wants to be
with them and would take care of them. He takes care
of them. He's a good example, good provider, works
hard.
(R. 503) .
With regard to the Defendant, Ms. Jensen stated:
I
don't
think
[Michelle's]
a
very
good
housekeeper. The kids often, I felt like, were not as
well taken care of as they should have been.
She
liked being affectionate. I thought the bad part of
that was she was very physical with other people,
especially men.
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I don't think [Michelle] would take as good a care
of them. I don't think she would be able to provide
for them, physically as well as mentally, as well as
Eric could emotionally.
(R. 504).
Cassandra Wahlstrom, another neighbor, testified that she
had no concerns about Eric receiving custody of the parties'
minor children.

(R. 514) .

about the Defendant.

However, she did voice concerns

Specifically, she was concerned that the

Defendant "doesn't spend enough time with the kids.
always angry.

They need a lot more support.

can provide it right now."

They are

I don't think she

(R. 515).

Finally, Josef Mark Dickes, testified that he was involved
with the Defendant when he was only 17 and that the minor child,
Shayla, walked

in on he

and

the Defendant

when

they

kissing.
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel]
involved with Michelle Hogan?
A.

Joe, were you ever

Yes.

Q. Sir, during any particular time, were you
involved in kissing her and the child, Shayla, walked
in on the two of you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Where did that occur?

A.

Front room of their house.

Q.

What was your age at the time, Joe?
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were

A.

17.

Q.

What's your age now?

A.

22.

(R. 743).
Most importantly, the professionals who testified in this
case

testified

at

length regarding

the

Plaintiff's

overall

strengths and Defendant's characterological defects and how such
defects would affect Defendant's fitness and ability to parent
the minor children.

First, a review of Kim Peterson's testimony

reveals that a principal

factor in his evaluation was that

Michelle was home during the day.6
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Sir, I want to get
to the very bottom line on the recommendations, then
move backwards, if I may.
Your assumption is basing it is because Michelle
being home; isn't that correct?
A.

That is a major factor, yes.

Q. In fact, that's probably the major factor, of
her being able to be home, is it not, sir?
A. Well, that is a major factor but it's taken in
the context of the fact that her basic parenting has
been very adequate.

Provided the importance of the custody evaluator's
testimony, the Plaintiff again requests this court's
indulgence in reviewing the transcript of his testimony
inasmuch as Plaintiff cannot possibly relate all
dispositive testimony in the body of this brief.
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Q. What if Eric were able to have his job change
and he's at home, he's providing personal care for
Andrew at that point?7
A. Under those circumstances, that would put him
in a better position, since he already has custody and
since his psychological functioning is better.
I
guess the question I would have, though, is, you know,
what would be the circumstances of that employment.
You know, how much time would he actually have to
parent?
(R. 608-609).
Kim Peterson also testified:
[Michelle] minimizes her behavior in [accepting
responsibility] and she projects blame onto Eric for
her behavior, believing that if he had been more
emotional or a better communicator, more sensitive,
that she would not have had that need.
(R. 616) .
In addition to the Plaintiff being more psychologically
stable than the Defendant (R. 609), Kim Peterson also testified
that Eric was more involved than an average father.
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] If we might put it in
terms of context of a normal father, was he more
involved with these children than what a normal father
would be?
A. I'd
average.

say

he's probably

more

involved

than

(R. 619).
In fact, the Plaintiff testified at trial that he had
procured new employment where he would indeed be working
out of his home. (R. 298).
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The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory for both
parties was made part of the court record.

(R. 22-24).

regard to the Plaintiff, the profile provided as follows:
Symptomatic Pattern
This MMPI profile is within normal limits,
suggesting that the client is reporting no serious
psychological problems.
He seems to have no
unmanageable psychological conflicts or threatening
stressors at this time, and his personal adjustment
appears to be adequate.
He seems to be dealing
effectively with situational demands and is obtaining
satisfaction out of his life. He appears to have no
sex-role conflicts.
Interpersonal Relations
Quite outgoing and sociable, he has a strong need
to be around others. Although he is gregarious and
effective at gaining recognition from others his
personal relationships may be somewhat superficial.
He appears to be rather spontaneous and expressive and
may manipulate others, especially to gain social
status. He may be impulsive at times and act without
sufficient forethought.
With respect to the Defendant, the profile provided:
Symptomatic Pattern
Individuals with this MMPI profile tend to be
chronically maladjusted.
Narcissistic and rather
self-indulgent, the client is somewhat dependent and
demands attention from others.
She appears to be
rather hostile and irritable and tends to resent
others.
She has great trouble showing anger and may
express it in passive-aggressive ways. She may have
a problem with acting out behavior and may have
experienced difficulty with her sexual behavior in the
past. She tends to blame her own difficulties on
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With

others and refuses to accept responsibility for her
own problems.
Interpersonal Relations
She is experiencing great difficulty in her social
relationships, and feels that others do not understand
her and do not give her enough sympathy.
She is
somewhat aloof, cold, non-giving, and uncompromising,
and attempts to advance herself at the expense of
others.
She may have a tendency to be verbally
aggressive
toward
her
husband
when
he
feels
frustrated.
She seems to have a poor marital
adjustment.
Behavioral Stability
This profile reflects a pattern of long-standing
poor adjustment.
Her anger may produce periods of
intense interpersonal difficulty.
Diagnostic Considerations
An individual with this profile is usually viewed
as having a Personality Disorder, such as a PassiveAggressive or Paranoid personality. The possibility
of a Paranoid Disorder should be considered, however,
individuals with this profile tend not to seek
psychological treatment on their own, and they are
usually not good candidates for psychotherapy. They
resist psychological interpretation, argue and tend to
rationalize and blame others for their problems. In
addition, they frequently leave therapy prematurely.
(R. 22-24) .
Dr. Jay Thomas was commissioned by Kim Peterson to perform
psychological

evaluations on each of the parties.

Certain

relevant portions of his deposition were read into evidence.
[Plaintiff's counsel] Line 7: "Sir, in all of
your particular testimony, did it show that Eric
could--was dealing appropriately with his feelings and
emotions?
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"Answer: From an ideal, it would have been nice
for him to have more emotional awareness. From the
more stereotypical male way of handling things through
problem solving, he was very normal. I do not see
avoidance, I do not see denial. I did not see what I
would consider externalization of responsibility. So
in that sense, yes, he was reasonable and fairly
normal."
"How about Michelle?", was the question.
"Answer:
I had concerns because of the
inconsistencies and the way she presented to me, both
clinically as well as testing, where there was
indications of no anxiety, but a good deal of anxiety
where she was wanting to develop a relationship with
me where I would support her and reassure her. That's
considered either poor boundaries or poor developed
sense of herself of distinguishing what's reasonable
and what's appropriate for a situation."

"Sir, did either one of these people--would you
consider them to be psychologically healthy?"
"Answer:

They appear to be."

"Question:

Okay.

How about physiologically"

"I would have concerns about Michelle," is
the answer.
"Question:

Okay.

What are those concerns?"

"Answer: My concerns are as she displays a number
of what are considered features of personality
disorder.
I will not make a diagnosis of a formal
disorder because my evaluation was not tentatively a
differential diagnostic evaluation. And so I could
not comprehensively or systematically address the
dimensions of a personality disorder. But there were
degrees of self-absorption, degrees of poor impulse
control or immediate-need gratification."
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"Other qualities that would suggest some degree of
narcissistic personality features or some histrionics
personality features, where someone wants inordinate
amounts of attention, affection, caretaking."

"Okay. It would be for the final determination of
the Court, but do you have conclusions from one
point--it should be one parent, I don't know at this
point, over the other in regards to an ability to parent
these children?"
"Answer:
Based solely on the psychological
testing and as that information was made available to
me, my clinical judgment would be that Eric would have
more
stability
and predictability
and
general
appropriateness to parent these children."
(R. 760-63).
Nina Parker Cohen, an Assistant Professor in the Department
of

Pediatrics

at

the

University

of

Utah

Medical

School,

testified regarding how those characterological defects detected
by Dr. Jay Thomas would affect one's ability to parent.
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Ma'am, I'm going to
ask you in regards to some items. If a parent has
items where they are emotionally needy, immature and
self-focused, how does that affect the children?
A. Yes. Again, in the abstract. Those kind of
characteristics could lead to possible neglect of the
children, children's needs, both emotional and
physical. Really a whole variety of things, but that
would be one of my major concerns, given those kinds
of characteristics.
Q. If a person has a characteristic where they're
deemed to be basically narcissistic
in their
personality, how does that relate to their ability to
parent a child?
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The definition of the characteristics that we
typically think of when we think about narcissism
would be an individual who is very immature, very
self-centered, very focused, uses other individuals to
kind of mirror and fulfill kind of their own sense of
self, and constantly needy of attention from others.
Now, if--I mean--and the question that you asked
then was how could that affect parenting. Once again,
if you have an individual like that who would be very
insensitive to the needs of others, to their children,
that could lead to possible neglect.
(R. 356-58).
Kent D. McDonald, a clinical director at Sandy Counseling
Center, reviewed Mr. Peterson's custody evaluation and disagreed
with the conclusions and recommendations therein. He testified:
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Okay. In regards to
the report, what is the appropriate way in which these
items are supposed to be prepared?
A. According to court rules, the first item of
consideration is whether or not the children are happy
and well cared for in their current custodial
situation.
Q. And in regards to that, what did you--what
information did you get in regards to the children in
regards to that particular situation?
A. From my reading, it appeared that they were
happy and well cared for in their present situation.
Q. What is the next item that you look for in
evaluation?
A. Excuse me. When we look for an evaluation,
one of the things we're looking for is the best
interest of the children in terms of are they--is
there some kind of something in the mental or
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emotional makeup of either parent that is likely to be
detrimental to the well-being of the children.
Q. And in regards to that, what was found in
regards to the mental makeup being of these parties?

A. It referred to each of them as having certain
emotional deficits which would be detrimental to
taking care of the children.

Q. Were you concerned about the evaluation in
regards to the opinions as opined by Mr. Peterson?
A. I think what I said at the time was that,
given the same information, I would have leaned the
other direction.
Q.

Meaning what?

A. Meaning
that
this,
like
many
custody
evaluations, shows that neither parent is perfect and
that given the fact that the children appeared to be
doing fairly well where they were, I would probably
have leaned to leave them where they were.
Q. Were you concerned about the portrayal about
the role model as referred by in Mr. Peterson's report
of the defendant?

A. It appeared
terribly stable.

that

Q.

Of whom?

A.

Of Mrs. Hogan.

the

role

model

was

not

Q. Did you have any other concerns about the
report of Mr. Peterson?
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A. My feeling was that there were obviously some
things he had seen that were not in the report.
Because based on the report, which is all I say, I
would have come to a different conclusion.
(R. 343-47).
Finally, Jerry Gardner, a therapist, who had met with the
parties on a regular basis, submitted a letter to the court (R.
824-25) , which letter had previously been made part of the court
record.

It provided:

I have seen both parties on a regular basis,
consequent to these sessions and test evaluations I
would conclude that Mr. Hogan has the stability and
parenting skills superior to Ms. Hogan. Ms. Hogan's
test profiles are particularly disturbing. She would
benefit from comprehensive psychotherapy to reach the
destructive impulses responsible for her narcissism
and immaturity. Until this can be accomplished it may
be beneficial for the children to be with their
father.
(R. 25).
The

foregoing

testimony

and

evidence

conclusively

demonstrates that the clear weight of the evidence did not
support the finding that the Defendant was a fit and proper
person to be awarded primary/residential custody of the parties'
minor

children.

Rather, the clear weight

of

the

evidence

demonstrates that the Defendant was not a fit parent to be
awarded custody based on consistent poor judgment in relating to
the minor children and ongoing conspicuous relationships with
other men in front of the minor children.
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More dispositive,

however,

is

the

overwhelming

and

uncontroverted

testimony

regarding the Defendant's profound characterological defects and
emotional stability including self-centeredness and narcissism
which

certainly

affects

her

ability

to

parent

the

minor

children.
Conversely, the cited evidence demonstrates that while the
Plaintiff

may

have

certain

weaknesses,

he

possesses

no

characterological or personality defects that would affect his
parenting.

Instead, the testimony overwhelmingly shows that he

has been a strong source of emotional support and stability to
the minor children throughout their lives.

Accordingly, the

court's finding that the Defendant is a fit person to be awarded
the primary custody of the children should be reversed as should
the ultimate conclusion flowing from that finding.

POINT III
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT "THE MOST COMPELLING
FACTOR WEIGHING IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT [HAVING CUSTODY]
IS A STRONGER WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT
TO SEE THAT VISITATION CONTINUES WITH THE OTHER PARENT."
In the present case, the District Court found that:
h. [T] he most compelling factor weighing in favor
of the defendant is a stronger willingness on the part
of the defendant to see that visitation continues with
the other parent. The court believes that is very
appropriate that each of the parties maintain their
substantial relationship with the children, including
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substantial time with the children. The court found
no indication of interference with parental contact on
the part of the defendant.
(R. 218-19).
In order to challenge a finding, the challenging party must
"marshall

the evidence

demonstrate

that

in support of

despite

this

the

evidence,

finding
the

trial

and

then

court's

finding [is] so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear
weight of the evidence,' thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'11
Haqen v. Haqen, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991) . (quoting In
Re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); accord
4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 889 P.2d 467, 471
(Utah 1995) .
In the instant action, the only evidence to support the
above finding is the testimony of the Defendant.
Q. [By Counsel for Defendant]
Have you been
regular in exercising your visitation?
A. [By Defendant] Yes, I have. I've tried extra
also, but his mother and Eric refuse to let me do
that.
Q. On how many occasions have you asked for extra
time with the children?
A. Well, at first I was so worried about the
children's trauma and my trauma, of course, but their
trauma. I'd been their caretaker for all their lives,
and I was just really worried about their welfare,
their routine.
I'm the only one that knows their
routine and what they like. And so I tried to go over
just to drop by and because the children would cry,
his mother said, "I don't think you should come over
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any more.
It's too hard on the kids."
Well of
course it's hard on the kids. I thought it was better
that they see me than not.
Q. Have you had--what was the understanding in
what weeknight you were going to be given visitation?
A. My understanding has always been that it was
any night of the weeknight. And I discussed that with
Eric many times, as he said, "we did discuss it." But
he left out the part that we discussed that it could
be any night of the week. And he said, "well, I have
to know a certain night I can always count on."
I said, "Well, as far as I know, Thursday is okay."
But occasionally, I had conflicts and occasionally he
would not let me see them at all because of those
conflicts.
Q.

How far in advance would you call him and ask?

A.

Two days.

Q.

What was his response to that?

A.

"That's not long enough notice."

Q. Would he tell you why it wasn't long enough
notice? I mean, did they have--did he indicate-A. No. No.
"I have plans too," he would say.
"That's not long enough notice." I thought two days
was being--long enough notice.
(R.

692) .
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Defendant subsequently

acknowledged that she had consistent visitation with the
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children on Thursday evenings8.

She further acknowledged that

she did not even exercise the court ordered visitation.
Q.
[By Plaintiff's counsel]
Ma'am let's talk
about your visitation. You say that you've tried or
wanted extra visitation, correct?
A.

[By Defendant]

Yes.

Q. The order that's available says that you're to
have one weeknight each week.
A.

Yes.

Q. You've only exercised one every other week,
haven't you?
A.

No.

Q. You've been there every week?
Thursday evening-A.

Right.

Q.

--through Sunday.

A.

Right.

Q.

And the following week--

You get a

So that's that week.

A. I get them another night, yes. So I have them
every--I see them every Thursday night almost.
Q. The order actually provides that you have
another weeknight during that week.
A. No. I believe, it's my understanding, I have
them from Thursday through Sunday of one week, and one
weeknight during the next week. That would give me an

Defendant's testimony on its face demonstrates that the
Plaintiff did not interfere with visitation between the
Defendant and the parties' minor children.
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extra night during the week I have them already.
wouldn't make sense.
Q.

Just for quick reading.

A.

I see my children as much as I can.

That

Q. Ma'am, I'm reading from a minute entry from
which the order was prepared from Mr. Atherton. "The
Plaintiff be awarded the primary physical custody,
subject to defendant's right to liberal visitation or
alternate weekends, from Thursday at 6:00 p.m. through
Sunday at 6:00 p.m., and one evening each week from
5:00 p.m. till 8:00 p.m.".
You didn't exercise that other date, then did you?
A. Nobody ever made it clear that that was the
case. I had enough trouble getting them on the days
we thought I actually saw-(R. 733) (emphasis added).
Conversely, the Plaintiff testified as follows with respect
to visitation:
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel] Sir, have you had
any problems with Michelle in regards to getting the
scheduling between the two of you handled in regards
to the children and-A.

[By Plaintiff]

Q.

Okay.

A great deal of trouble.

What is the nature of that problem?

A. The court allows every other weekend, Thursday
through Saturday, plus one weeknight.
We set up
Thursday night to be that weeknight.
Originally,
Shayla had dance on Thursday and Michelle wanted to
take the kids on Thursday, so dance was moved till
Wednesday.
I--I scheduled T-Ball practices for Wednesday so
Michelle could take them on Thursday. I scheduled my
church meeting for Thursday night because I assumed
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the kids would be gone. We worked everything so that
Michelle could take the kids on Thursday nights.
A couple of months ago, Michelle stated saying she
didn't want it, she couldn't take them on Thursday
nights any more, she had other things to do.
Her
exact statement was "I have my own life now and I can
pick up the kids any time I want."
Several times I tried to talk with Michelle about
our schedule and tried to explain that we need to have
a schedule also. My parents wanted to go to their
Utah Pioneers meeting on Thursday nights. We'd set
everything up so that the kids would be gone.
Michelle wanted to take them on different nights. She
had other things to do.

Because we've had a lot of trouble and I tried
many times to talk to Michelle about it, you know,
that we need to have a schedule, we need to be able to
plan. And Michelle would call me and start to yell
and swear and hang up. A common response is, "well,
I'm going to call my attorney, and she's going to call
your attorney and it will just cost you money."
-We have not been able to--Michelle calls and wants
to take them on a different night. I don't tell her
she can't take them.
I try and talk to her about
giving us more notice or setting a schedule, and she
gets mad and hangs up without ever resolving it.
(R. 278-280).
Q. Have you had a time recently where Michelle
didn't even pick the kids up on her Thursday?
A. It's not recently. It's been a few months,
several months ago.
The kids were ready to go at
5:00. At 5:30, we called Michelle and asked her when
she was coming. My parents were gone, I was getting
ready to leave. Michelle indicated that she would not
be coming that night, that she had--she would be--she
was staying at home but she had things to do, and that
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she would not be picking them up that night.
kids sat at the table and bawled.

Both

Q. Did she inform you previously that she wasn't
going to pick up the children?
A. No, she did not. As a result, I stayed home
from my church meeting and stayed with the kids.
(R. 290-92).
On cross examination, the Plaintiff further testified:
Q. [By Defendant's counsel]
Now, she's still
exercising visitation on Thursday, isn't she?
A.

No, she is not.

Q.

What night does she exercise her visitation?

A.

She tries to get them another night.

Q.

Pardon?

A. She has them every other week from Thursday
through Sunday.
That night, she does take them on
Thursday. On the other Thursdays, the last several
months, she has not wanted to take them on Thursday.
She's wanted to take them on other nights.
Q.

Has she taken them on other nights?

A.

Yes, she has.

Q. Has she regularly visited with the children at
least one night during the week?
A.

Except for a few times that were missed, yes.

(R. 408) .
Finally, at the further hearing on August 10, 1995, the
Plaintiff testified that the Defendant had refused to allow him
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reasonable visitation during the interim period between the
initial three days of trial and the final hearing.
Q. [By Plaintiff's counsel]
Sir, during this
interim time since we were last here, what visitation
have you had with the children?
A.

Every other weekend and one weeknight.

Q. And, sir have you
visitation from Michelle?

requested

A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

And what has been her response?

additional

A. I asked Michelle if I could have them for
another week. They've been off-track for six weeks.
I had them for the first week.
Then the court
decision was made. Michelle has had them since. I
asked if I could have them for another week, and she
said she would need to speak to her attorney and she
would not let them--me take them for another week. So
she's had them for five weeks. I had them for the
first week.
Q. Sir, have you had any trouble in regards to
the visitation that has occurred between the two of
you, in regards to pickup, drop-offs or any other
items?
A. That has always been the case.
been a very tough situation.
(R.

It has always

598-99).
Defendant's

self-serving

statements

that

the

Plaintiff

interfered with visitation by denying untimely requests for
alternate visitation is insufficient to support the district
court's finding that there was a "stronger willingness on the
part of the defendant to see that visitation continues with the
41

other

parent."

This

is

particularly

true

in

light

of

Defendant's subsequent admission that she had regular visitation
on Thursday evenings, which testimony was corroborated by that
of the Plaintiff. Moreover, Plaintiff's testimony that the only
time he was inflexible with regard to visitation was when the
children

had

Accordingly,

scheduled

activities

such finding

was

uncontroverted.

should be stricken as baseless.

Furthermore, inasmuch as the court explicitly prescribed that
such finding was the most compelling

factor in determining

custody, the court's award of custody of the parties' minor
children to the Defendant should be vacated and this issue be
remanded

to

the

district

court

for

more

appropriate

and

factually based findings on the custody issue.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this court should reverse the
District Court's award of custody of the parties' minor children
to

the Defendant

Defendant

and

as well

remand

this

as

its

case

to

award
the

of

alimony

District

to

the

Court

for

proceedings consistent with evidence and the record herein.
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DATED this/_£_T"day of June, 1996
OLSEN & OLSEN

MITCHELL J. OLSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the __z^£^aay of June, 1996, I
mailed

a true

and

correct

copy of

the

foregoing

BRIEF

OF

APPELLANT, postage prepaid thereon to:
Ann L. Wassermann
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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: ADDENDUM "A"

COPY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE
DATED JULY 31, 1995
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RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011
Attorney for Plaintiff
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax: (801) 539-8236
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DECREE OF DIVORCE

ERIC HUGH HOGAN,

aa.o\%43
c

%-3- fe-%asi<wv,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 944902846DA

MICHELLE WHITEHEAD HOGAN,

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for Trial before the
Honorable David

S. Young, Judge of the above entitled

court

commencing on the 5th day of July and continuing thereafter to the
7th day of July, 1995.

The plaintiff was present and represented

by his attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow.

The defendant was

present and represented by her attorney of record, Ann Wassermann.
The court having previously having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and now based upon such and for good cause
appearing herein
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving

the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties and

the same shall become final upon entry,
2.
children.

The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the
During the time period of July 8, 1995 to August 10,

1995 the children shall reside with the defendant, A determination
by the court of the children's primary residence shall be reviewed
and determined by the court on August 10, 1995 at the hearing to be
held on that date at 8:00 a.m.

The parties may supplement to the

court any additional matters which they deem relevant for the
determination of residential custody at the hearing on August 10,
1995.

Neither party is to discuss the matter with the children or

to coax the children in any form or fashion during this interim.
The plaintiff shall have visitation to the parties' minor children
which shall be liberal visitation and something greater but not
less than that as provided pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35.
3.

The defendant is awarded the home and residence of the

parties subject to the plaintiff's lien owing against the residence
of one-half

(1/2) of the equity of the home which is to be

determined from the fair market value of the home of $94,000.00
less the outstanding mortgage balance owing as of July 7, 1995.
The plaintiff's one-half (1/2) equity share shall be due and owing
upon the first of the following conditions to occur:

00003232.95

a.

defendant's remarriage

b.

defendant's co-habitation
2

c.

defendant selling the home or no longer using the

home as her primary residence
d.

the youngest of the parties' minor children reaching

the age of 18.
4.

Each of the parties are to bear and be responsible for

their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter.
5.

The personal property of the parties is divided as follow:
To the plaintiff:
Coleman stove
Coleman lantern (from wedding)
Coleman lantern (from Brett)
Ice Chest
(from wedding)
Other large Ice Chest
Pup Tent
TV
Grandfather's Tool Chest
Tools from Grandfather
Gravy Bowl
To the defendant:
VCR
Bookcase
Bookcase
Couch
Loveseat
Wheat Grinder
Vacuum
Piano
Food Storage
Blue Ice Chest (from wedding)
Orange Drink Cooler
Dome Tent
Washing Machine
Dryer
Computer and Desk
Answering Machine

00003232.95

3

Volley Ball Poles
Bed that came from Defendant's Parents
Household tools
Gardening tools
Encyclopedia
To the children:
Beds
Dressers
Toys
Clothes
The child Dustin from defendant's prior marriage is
allowed to use the trombone that belongs to plaintiff's father
however, if said child ever stops taking band or is no longer in
need of the trombone it is to be returned to the plaintiff
immediately.
6.

The debts incurred during the course of the marriage are

reserved for adjudication on August 10, 1995. The issue of alimony
is reserved for adjudication on August 10, 1995.
7.

During the interim time period to the August 10, 1995

hearing, the plaintiff is to maintain the payment on the mortgage
of approximately $490.00, the van payment of approximately $186.00
and to pay a one time lump sum amount of $500.00 for child support.
These amounts as paid herein by the plaintiff may be adjusted by
the court and appropriately modified at the hearing to be held
August 10, 1995.

00003232.95
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8.

The plaintiff shall maintain the insurances for medical

and dental coverage as it may be made available to him through his
employment.

The insurance coverage as presently to be maintained

by the defendant is through COBRA at a cost of approximately
$400.00 per month for and on behalf of the parties' minor children.
The responsibility of the any insurance premium shall be determined
at the August 10, 1995 hearing.

Each party shall pay one-half

(1/2) of all reasonable and necessary non-covered medical, dental,
orthodontic, optical and prescription costs which are incurred on
behalf of the parties' minor children.

If the defendant has

available to her through any employment which she obtains insurance
coverage for and on behalf of the parties' minor children then she
shall provide the same.
9.

All of the matters are reserved and shall be adjudicated

by the court on August 10, 1995 at 8:00 a.m.
DATED this

00003232.95

3 / ^^ay^of July, 1995.

5

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ANN WASSERMANN
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM "B"

COPY OF FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
DATED JULY 31. 1995

RANDY S. LUDLOW #2 011
Attorney for Plaintiff
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-13 00
Fax: (801) 539-8236
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ERIC HUGH HOGAN,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 944902846DA

MICHELLE WHITEHEAD HOGAN,

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for Trial before the
Honorable David

S. Young, Judge of the above entitled

court

commencing on the 5th day of July and continuing thereafter to the
7th day of July, 1995.

The plaintiff was present and represented

by his attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow.

The defendant was

present and represented by her attorney of record, Ann Wassermann.
The court having received evidence including custody evaluations
and related reports, taken testimony from numerous witnesses and
the parties as well as the court receiving arguments from counsel
and based upon such and for good cause appearing herein the court
makes these its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties are residents of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah and have been for more than three months immediately prior to
the commencement of this action•
2.

Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife having been

married on July 12, 1986 in Salt Lake County, Utah.
3.

During

the

course

of

the

marriage

irreconcilable

differences have arisen between the parties making continuation of
the marriage impossible.
4.

The parties have had born as issued to them three (3)

children, to wit: Shayla Cherie Hogan, born April 11, 1987; Keith
Clark Hogan, born May 12, 1989; and Andrew Eric Hogan, born May 18,
1993.

It is appropriate and just that the parties be awarded the

joint legal custody of the parties' minor children.

For the time

period from July 8, 1995 until August 10, 1995, the children shall
reside with the defendant.
5.

The plaintiff has been providing medical and dental

insurance coverage as available to him through his employment for
and on behalf of the parties' minor children.

The plaintiff has

obtained new employment and there will not be insurance coverage
immediately available to him through the employment. The plaintiff
will be maintaining insurances on behalf of the parties' minor
children through COBRA.
00003231.95

The costs for the insurance coverage on
2

behalf of the parties' minor children is approximately the sum of
$400.00 per month.
6.

The plaintiff has obtained new employment from which she

will be receiving the sum of approximately $2,800.00 per month.
The defendant has not sought employment on a full-time basis and
the court does not believe that it is appropriate for the defendant
to not seek and obtain full-time employment.
7.

During the course of the marriage the parties acquired a

home and real property which home has a value of approximately
$94,000.00.
8.

The parties have acquired

items of personal

property

through the course of the marriage.
9.

The parties have acquired debts and obligations during the

course of the marriage.
10.

Each of the parties have acquired attorney's fees as a

result of this action.
WHEREFORE, the court having made its Findings of Fact, now
makes these its:
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1.

The plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving

the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties and
the same shall become final upon entry.

00003231.95
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2.
children.

The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the
During the time period of July 8, 1995 to August 10,

1995 the children shall reside with the defendant. A determination
by the court of the children's primary residence shall be reviewed
and determined by the court on August 10, 1995 at the hearing to be
held on that date at 8:00 a.m.

The parties may supplement to the

court any additional matters which they deem relevant for the
determination of residential custody at the hearing on August 10,
1995.

Neither party is to discuss the matter with the children or

to coax the children in any form or fashion during this interim.
The plaintiff shall have visitation to the parties' minor children
which shall be liberal visitation and something greater but not
less than that as provided pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35.
3.

The defendant is awarded the home and residence of the

parties subject to the plaintiff's lien owing against the residence
of one-half

(1/2) of the equity of the home which is to be

determined from the fair market value of the home of $94,000.00
less the outstanding mortgage balance owing as of July 7, 1995.
The plaintiff's one-half (1/2) equity share shall be due and owing
upon the first of the following conditions to occur:

00003231.95

a.

defendant's remarriage

b.

defendant's co-habitation
4

c.

defendant selling the home or no longer using the

home as her primary residence
d.

the youngest of the parties' minor children reaching

the age of 18.
4.

Each of the parties are to bear and be responsible for

their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter.
5. The personal property of the parties is divided as follow:
To the plaintiff:
Coleman stove
Coleman lantern (from wedding)
Coleman lantern (from Brett)
Ice Chest
(from wedding)
Other large Ice Chest
Pup Tent
TV
Grandfather's Tool Chest
Tools from Grandfather
Gravy Bowl
To the defendant:
VCR
Bookcase
Bookcase
Couch
Loveseat
Wheat Grinder
Vacuum
Piano
Food Storage
Blue Ice Chest (from wedding)
Orange Drink Cooler
Dome Tent
Washing Machine
Dryer
Computer and Desk
Answering Machine
00003231.95
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Volley Ball Poles
Bed that came from Defendant's Parents
Household tools
Gardening tools
Encyclopedia
To the children:
Beds
Dressers
Toys
Clothes
The child Dustin from defendant's prior marriage is
allowed to use the trombone that belongs to plaintiff's father
however, if said child ever stops taking band or is no longer in
need of the trombone it is to be returned to the plaintiff
immediately.
6.

The debts incurred during the course of the marriage are

reserved for adjudication on August 10, 1995. The issue of alimony
is reserved for adjudication on August 10, 1995.
7.

During the interim time period to the August 10, 1995

hearing, the plaintiff is to maintain the payment on the mortgage
of approximately $490.00, the van payment of approximately $186.00
and to pay a one time lump sum amount of $500.00 for child support.
These amounts as paid herein by the plaintiff may be adjusted by
the court and appropriately modified at the hearing to be held
August 10, 1995.

00003231.95
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8.

The plaintiff shall maintain the insurances for medical

and dental coverage as it may be made available to him through his
employment.

The insurance coverage as presently to be maintained

by the defendant is through COBRA at a cost of approximately
$400.00 per month for and on behalf of the parties' minor children.
The responsibility of the any insurance premium shall be determined
at the August 10, 1995 hearing.

Each party shall pay one-half

(1/2) of all reasonable and necessary non-covered medical, dental,
orthodontic, optical and prescription costs which are incurred on
behalf of the parties/ minor children.

If the defendant has

available to her through any employment which she obtains insurance
coverage for and on behalf of the parties7 minor children then she
shall provide the same.
9.

All of the matters are reserved and shall be adjudicated

by the court on August 10, 1995 at 8:00 a.m.
DATED this 3 /

00003231.95

day of July, 1995.

7

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ANN WASSERMANN
Attorney for Defendant

00003231.95
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HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy
of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DECREE

OF DIVORCE, by hand delivering the same in a sealed envelope, this
^ffl^day of July, 1995 to the following:
ANN WASSERMANN
426 SOUTH 500 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102
(Leslie Frederick
Secretary

00003231.95
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ADDENDUM "C"

COPY OF SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND ORDER
DATED NOVEMBER 7. 1995

Third Judicial District

NOV

T

By.

7 1995
'

bup«-itv Clerk

RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011
Attorney for Plaintiff
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-13 00
Fax: (801) 539-8236
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ERIC HUGH HOGAN,

££Oi8^?>

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 944902846DA

MICHELLE WHITEHEAD HOGAN,

Judge David S. Young

Defendant.
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for final adjudication of
various matters on August 10, 1995, the Honorable David S. Young
presiding.

The plaintiff was presented and represented by his

attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow.

The defendant was present and

represented by her attorney of record, Ann Wassermann.
having

taken

additional

testimony

and arguments

from

The court
counsel.

Based upon such and for good cause appearing herein the court makes
these its:
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
awarded

Each of the parties are fit and proper persons to be
the

care,

custody

and

control

of

the

parties 7

minor

children, and an award of joint custody is appropriate, with the

residential

custody

to be with

the mother •

The

court has

determined in weighing the factors as set forth in Rule 4-903 of
the Code of Judicial Administration and the other factors as
presented to the court at trial that it would be in the best
interest of the children to be with the defendant •

The factors

weighed include:
a.

The preference of the children with respect to each

parent is comparable;
b. The court view that it is preferable to keep siblings
together, including half siblings, and this weighs normally in
favor of the defendant. The court cautions against the older halfsiblings not straining the relationship with the plaintiff, and if
there is inappropriate action between the older half-siblings and
the younger children of this marriage, then that may be a factor in
future events weighing in favor of changing custody, but at present
it is not a factor;

case.

c.

The children have bonds with both of the parents;

d.

The factors of previous custody are neutral in this

The defendant had been the primary caretaker up until the

separation of the parties, and the children have also done well in
the temporary custody of the plaintiff.

In addition, there are

better accommodations in the home with the defendant, and the

00003295.95
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children are familiar with that neighborhood where the defendant
resides;
e.

With respect to the moral character and emotional

stability of the parties, this factor weighs in favor of the
plaintiff.

Each of the parents have a strong desire for custody,

and the duration and desire for custody is comparable.

Prior to

the separation the children were most likely bonded more closely to
the defendant;
f.

The parties' religious

compatibility

with

the

children is appropriate and comparable though the plaintiff has
shown a little stronger devotion in this area;
g.

The financial circumstances of the parties weighs in

favor of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff has better earnings, but

appears to be passing much of the responsibility for the care of
the children in the home environment to his mother.

Parents are

preferred over the grandparents for the care of the children;
h.

The most compelling factor weighing in favor of the

defendant is a stronger willingness on the part of the defendant to
see that visitation continues with the other parent.

The court

believes that it is very appropriate that each of the parties
maintain

their

substantial

relationship

with

the

children,

including substantial time with the children. The court found no
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indication of interference with parental contact on the part of the
defendant.
2.

Income is to be imputed to the defendant in the amount of

$731.00 per month and to the plaintiff in the amount of $2,800.00
per month.

Based upon such the defendant is to receive child

support from the plaintiff in the amount of $753.00.
3.

Because of the high costs of insurance premiums the same

should not be required to be maintained at present.
4.

The plaintiff is presently living with his parents and as

a result of the same his costs for housing and food and related
expenses are not as great as those of the defendant.

As

plaintiff's circumstances change his payments for alimony as are
required herein shall be re-evaluated.
5.

Based upon the plaintiff's present living conditions he

has an ability to pay and the defendant has a need for alimony
therefore, plaintiff should pay to the defendant the sum of $400.00
per month as alimony which shall terminate upon the first of the
following conditions to occur:
a) Defendant's remarriage.
b) Defendant's co-habitation.
c) Death of either party.
d) For a period of time no longer than the length of the
marriage which was nine (9) years.
e) As plaintiff's circumstances may change and warrant reevaluation.
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6.

The defendant shall be responsible for the house payment

and all obligations owing upon the home and to hold the plaintiff
harmless from the same.
7.
the

The defendant is awarded the 1990 Ford van together with

obligation

upon

said

automobile

and

she

is

to

hold

the

plaintiff harmless from the same.
8.

Each party shall bear their own attorneys fees and costs

incurred herein.
9.

The joint marital obligations that were incurred during

the marriage shall be required to be paid jointly by the parties
which includes to Colonial Bank of approximately $2,000.00 for spa
membership and Individual BankCard VISA of approximately $1,300.00
for counseling.

Any obligations that were incurred solely by that

party since the time of separation shall be borne by that party and
they are to hold the other harmless from the same.
10.
plaintiff

It

is appropriate that

the defendant

reimburse

$1,000.00 for her share of the costs of the

the

custody

evaluation.
11.

It is appropriate that the plaintiff be awarded open,

liberal and flexible visitation to the parties' minor children.

00003295.95
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. The parties are awarded the joint custody of the parties'
minor children with residential custody being with the defendant.
2.

The parties shall exchange information concerning the

health, education and welfare of the children and where possible,
confer before making decisions concerning these areas.
3.

The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant a child support

in the amount of $752.00 per month.
4.

Until such time that insurance coverage is obtained as a

benefit of employment of either of the parties then neither party
is required at this time to maintain health and dental insurance on
behalf of the parties' minor children.

If either party has

available to them at reasonable cost health and dental insurance on
behalf of the parties' minor children then they shall be required
to provide the same and any premium costs that are incurred on
behalf of the parties' minor children shall be borne equally by the
parties.

Each of the parties shall be responsible to pay one-half

(1/2) of all non-covered medical, dental, orthodontic, prescription
and optical expenses that are incurred on behalf of the parties'
minor children*.
5. The plaintiff shall be awarded open, liberal and flexible
visitation to the parties' minor children which shall be at a
00003295.95

6

minimum as provided pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §3 0-3-3 5 however
said weekend visitation as provided pursuant to said statute is
modified

such that the plaintiff would have the children from

Thursday through Sunday rather than the Friday through Sunday as
provided in said schedule and one evening each week.

Each of the

parties will be awarded one-half (1/2) of the children's off-track
time periods from school.
Any day care that is necessary on behalf of either party is to
be first offered to the other parent before seeking third party day
care.
6.

Each party shall be required to pay one-half (1/2) of all

work related day care expense as are incurred on behalf of the
parties' minor children.
7.
amount

The plaintiff is to pay to the defendant alimony in the
of

$400.00

per

month

and

continuing

thereafter

until

terminated by the first of the following conditions to occur:
a) Defendants remarriage
b) Defendants co-habitation
c) Death of either party
d) For a period of time no longer than the length of the
marriage of nine (9) years
e) As plaintiffs circumstances may change and warrant reevaluation.
8.

The defendant is required to pay the mortgages owing upon

the parties' home and to hold the plaintiff harmless from the same.

00003295.95
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9.

The defendant is awarded the 1990 Ford van and she is

required to make all payments upon the same and to hold the
plaintiff harmless the said obligations.
10.

The parties are to jointly pay any and all debts and

obligations that were incurred by them during the course of the
marriage, which includes Colonial Bank of approximately $2,000.00
and

Individual

BankCard

VISA

of

approximately

$1,300.00

for

counseling.
11.

Each party is required to pay any and all debts which

were incurred by that party since the date of separation and to
hold the other harmless from the same.
12.

The defendant is required to pay to the plaintiff

$1,000.00 as her share of the custody evaluation.
13. The plaintiff is awarded the two youngest children of the
parties for all tax purposes. If defendant would receive a benefit
by claiming on child for tax purposes she may do the same however
the plaintiff may purchase the exemption from defendant by paying
to defendant the difference between claiming and not claiming the
child.
/
/
/
/
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14.

Each party shall bear and be responsible for their own

attorneys fees and costs incurred in this matter.
DATED this _ 2 ^ 7 d a Y of J5fe£3£er7 1995.

BY THE COURT:^

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ANN WASSERMANN
Attorney for Defendant
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HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy
of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER, by hand
delivering the same in a sealed envelope, this
October, 1995 to the following:
ANN WASSERMANN
426 SOUTH 500 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102

dtf^Atd/ittff

i e s l i e Frederick
Secretary
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ADDENDUM "D"

COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL
DATED DECEMBER 6, 1995

MITCHELL J. OLSEN
Utah State Bar No. 3845
OLSEN & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
8138 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: 255-7176
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ERIC HUGH HOGAN,
Plaintiff,

:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

:

vs.

:

MICHELLE WHITEHEAD HOGAN,

:

Defendant.

:

Civil No. 944902846 DA

Judge David S. Young

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that ERIC HUGH HOGAN, the abovenamed plaintiff, by and through MITCHELL J. OLSEN of Olsen &
Olsen, L.L.C., hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the
final Supplemental Findings of Fact and Order of the Honorable
David S. Young dated November 7, 1995.

The appeal is taken

from such part of the order that states that:
1.

The parties are awarded the joint custody of

the parties' minor children with residential custody
being with the defendant.

2.

That plaintiff shall pay to the defendant

child support in the amount of $752.00 per month.
3.

That plaintiff is to pay to the defendant

alimony in the amount of 400.00 per month and continuing thereafter until terminated by the first of
the following conditions to occur:
a.

defendant's remarriage;

b.

defendant's cohabitation;

c.

death of either party;

d.

for a period of time no longer than the

length of the marriage or nine (9) years; or
e.

as plaintiff's circumstances may change and

warrant re-evaluation.
DATED this ^

1 day of December, 1995.
OLSEN & OLSEN

By:
MITCHELL J. OLSE^
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the (J)

day of December, 1995, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL
to the following with postage prepaid thereon:
Ann L. Wassermann, Esq.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for Defendant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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Plaintiff,
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VS,
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